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Can an interest-free credit facility be more efficient than a usurious payday loan? 
 
Abstract: Inefficiencies in mainstream credit markets have pushed selected households to 
frequent high cost payday loans for their liquidity needs.  Ironically, despite the prohibitive 
cost there is still persistent demand for the product.  This paper rides on the public policy 
objective of expanding affordable credit to rationed households.  Here, we expound a simple 
model that integrates inexpensive interest-free liquidity facility within an endogenous 
leverage circuit.  This builds on the technology of ROSCA/ ASCRA/ mutual/ financial 
cooperative and cultural beliefs indoctrinated in Islam.  Our results indicate the potential 
Pareto-efficiency of this interest-free circuit in contrast to the competing interest-bearing 
schemes of payday lenders and mainstream financiers.       
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 1. Introduction 
 
“Many people, particularly low-to-moderate income households, do not have access to 
mainstream financial products such as bank accounts and low-cost loans. Other households 
have access to a bank account, but nevertheless rely on more costly financial service providers 
for a variety of reasons. In addition to paying more for basic transaction and credit financial 
services, these households may be more vulnerable to loss or theft and often struggle to build 
credit histories and achieve financial security”. 
FDIC (2009, p.10) 
 
A survey by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 2009 carries concerns 
on the extent of financial rationing faced by American households.
1
  According to the FDIC 
(2009), approximately 17.9% or 21 million households who do have banking accounts subscribe 
to the services of alternative financial service providers.  With respect to their credit needs, these 
households have had to frequent these service providers, including payday loans.  In a separate 
study, Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008) find 73% of the surveyed payday loan borrowers 
suffered rejection or limitation on their credit application (i.e., rationed or completely rationed 
out) by mainstream financiers, which is three times above the United States general population.  
The use of payday loans are largely for unplanned events that highlights the liquidity constrained 
status of this cohort.   
Payday loans or cash advances, are structured to function as a short term liquidity facility 
to smooth inter-temporal income shocks.  This involves issuance of single, small, short-term and 
unsecured consumer loan, ranging from $100 to $500.  An average payday loan is for less than 
$300, with repayment period of 7 to 30 days (Lawrence and Elliehausen, 2008).  The industry 
has been severely criticised for its high credit cost, in combination with wider issues of predatory 
practices and expropriation of wealth (OFT, 2013).
2
  Undergirding these criticisms is the interest 
servicing burden (Melzer, 2011) faced by these households who are in the moderate to low 
income bracket, and lack financial sophistication (Lawrence and Elliehausen, 2008).  The fees 
reflect the industry’s severe default rates (DeYoung and Phillips, 2009).3  Interestingly, despite 
                                                          
1  A further 5 million households may potentially face similar constraints but have been omitted from the above 
due to paucity of data on their usage of alternative financial services (FDIC, 2009). 
2  Predatory lending is characterised by “excessively high interest rates or fees, and abusive or unnecessary 
provisions that do not benefit the borrower” (Carr and Kolluri, 2001, p.1).  
3  The industry’s default rate of 21% is extremely risky compared to the 3% rate experienced by commercial 
banks (DeYoung and Phillips, 2009).  We find that the high cost concurs with credit literature to compensate for 
risk associated with these risky borrowers. 
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 heavy criticisms, there is still persistent demand for the products.  Thus, this highlights a 
pressing need to explore inexpensive financial alternatives to assuage the liquidity needs of this 
market segment.
4
  The fact that these households have had to exhaust other credit avenues 
alludes to the rationed out effect and potentially non-Pareto efficient solution.  To date, studies 
on payday loans have either focused on (i) credit behaviours; or (ii) welfare effect of the 
borrowers, without delving on Pareto optimal substitutes.   
 Recognising this shortcoming, the primary motivation of this paper is to expound an 
institutional design for the provision of inexpensive, short-term liquidity facility, which satisfies 
the latent demand of these households to smooth their inter-temporal exogenous income shocks.  
Specifically, our study aims to explore the following question: Can an endogenous interest-free 
payday loan circuit provide a more efficient credit solution in contrast to current payday lenders 
and mainstream financiers?  This is achieved through integrating the two strands of literature on: 
(i) institutional structures related to endogenous circuits; with (ii) cultural beliefs (i.e., Islamic 
tenets) in particular, interest-free loans.
5,
 
6
  Our research motivation is consistent with that of 
Coase (1937) and Alchian (1950), who in their seminal papers rationalise efficient institutions as 
those that evolve and adapt to the environment to deliver services in a cost effective manner. 
Moreover, the approach taken in this paper to intertwine institutional design with culture is 
reflective of Acemoglu et al. (2005, p.424), who reiterate “belief differences clearly do play a 
role in shaping policies and institutions”.     
For the purpose of this paper, the target population are economically active households.  
This is consistent with the underwriting criteria of payday lenders that require borrowers to be in 
employment and bank account holders, as well as with the findings of the FDIC (2009) survey.  
                                                          
4  Although we have used the United States as the primary reference base, this does not preclude the existence of 
payday lending in other developed and developing economies.      
5  Forms of endogenous circuits include informal institutions of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCA) and Accumulating Savings and Credit Association (ASCRA), where members contribute periodically an 
amount of funds to a common pool over a specified period.  In ROSCA, the assignment of the pooled funds to each 
member is determined either (i) on random basis whereby the sequence is only known ex-post to the member at the 
point of disbursement; (ii) through a bidding process to the winning member who pledges higher contribution to the 
pot or one-time side payment to the other members; or (iii) fixed/ pre-determined ex-ante by the ROSCA governing 
authorities.  By pooling resources, it permits the mobilisation of funds that otherwise would have been kept out of 
circulation.  Whilst ASCRA shares similar features of its nemesis, there is greater flexibility in the amount and 
timing of each member contribution, larger membership, allocation of the pooled funds, and its greater social 
function (Bouman, 1995).  The motives for participating in ROSCA/ ASCRA ranges from savings mechanism to 
acquire durables, fund life-cycle events, self-control commitment device, insurance and investment avenue of 
surplus funds to either protect against social/ marital pressures or generate returns (Besley, 1993; Bouman, 1995; 
Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher, 2012).  Mutual and financial cooperatives are the more advanced and formal forms 
of these circuits.    
6  Charitable concept of interest-free funding is also present in other Abrahamic faiths.  For example, the 
existence of Jewish free loan societies is linked to the obligation in Judaism for extending free loans to the poor 
(Lewinson, 1999).  The integration of Islamic cultural beliefs in the design of this liquidity facility exemplifies its 
universality in ‘democratisation of finance’ to the masses. 
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 Additionally, our model is based on risk neutral economic agents.
7
  We illustrate the above 
through an institutional structure of an endogenous leverage circuit formed from member based 
contributions.
8
  This is followed by two stepped extensions that assimilate real world elements of 
having fraction of borrowers within a finite life circuit, and subsequently extending the circuit as 
a going concern with random repetitive borrowing.  The objective of the basic framework and 
the extensions are to solve for Pareto-efficiency by simultaneously (i) ensuring availability of 
affordable credit (where credit is due); and (ii) moderating their commitment issues that 
promotes long-term financial security.  This is showcased by mathematically modelling a short 
term interest-free liquidity facility circuit that moderates adverse selection and moral hazard.   
The beauty of the model lies in the structuring of the circuit, where members help one another to 
alleviate inter-temporal liquidity shocks such that the benefits of borrowing outweigh the cost of 
it.  This draws from the ‘barn raising’ practices in the United States frontiers discussed in Besley 
et al. (1993) and captures Commons’s viewpoint (1931, p.651), where he states “... collective 
action is more than control and liberation of individual action-it is expansion of the will of the 
individual far beyond what he can do by his own puny acts”.9    
This paper contributes to existing literature from four perspectives.  First, it averts 
expropriation of wealth of these households through establishing an alternative recourse for 
liquidity funding.  This is in contrast with liquidity stripping from onerous interest charges of 
current payday loans.  It conjointly satisfies public policy call for expansion of affordable credit.  
Second, our framework allows for satisfaction of liquidity needs of households as solution to 
rationing by mainstream financiers.  Third, we integrate interest-free loans in our liquidity 
facility.  This is drawn from charitable teachings, specifically from Islamic religious tenets that 
are proffered as a remedy to the prohibited interest (ribā an-nasi’ah).  Thus, it unveils the 
economic potential of this antiquated financing, conceived from cultural ideals, as a financial 
development device.  Fourth, by binding eligibility to the liquidity facility with a member’s 
                                                          
7  The paper adopts a simple framework of risk neutrality to derive close form solutions.  The model can be 
extended to risk-averse agents by incorporating higher opportunity cost of capital or discount rate ‘γ’ that comprises 
an imputed return ‘r’ (see equation (3) in Section 4).  However, we have chosen not to incorporate risk aversion as 
the resultant outcome only increases the threshold that the circuit needs to observe to ensure fulfilment of the 
Pareto-efficiency conditions, leaving its fundamentals unaffected.  Moreover, this would limit financial participation 
contrary to the injunction of the Qur’ān (the Holy Book of Islam verse 30:39) which prefers charity over exorbitant 
cost of funding especially for the underprivileged.  Our approach is also consistent with Ebrahim (2009).    
8  We employ a generic term ‘circuit’ to signify all institutions where the principal and agent are the same 
individual.  The structure is akin to that of a non-profit institution. An administrator may be present but is not 
incentivised by rent-seeking motives.   
9  Our model reiterates the significant developmental role of endogenous circuits in the 19
th
 century. These 
circuits permit greater latitude to grant its customers affordable credit compared to profit-oriented mainstream 
financiers.  Recently, the economic importance of endogenous circuits in the United Kingdom was further boosted 
by the legislative reforms that enabled these institutions (i) greater market reach; and (ii) flexibility to determine its 
member incentive structures (see HM Treasury, 2012).  
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 fulfilment of the periodical contributions ruling, it harnesses the commitment technology 
sacrosanct with endogenous leveraged circuit-based institutions.
10
  This effectively moderates 
the issue of time-inconsistent preferences closely associated with payday loan borrowers as well 
as shelters them from liquidity gaps arising from exogenous shocks.  
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the landscape of the 
payday lending industry and related literature.  Section 3 discusses the rationale for the 
prohibition of interest and its contrast against charitable modes in Islamic tenets.  In Section 4, 
we develop a simple model to illustrate the Pareto-efficiency of endogenous interest-free payday 
loan circuit in addressing financial constraints of these households and its results.  Finally, we 
conclude in Section 5.  
 
2. Landscape of payday industry and related literature 
 
Payday lending emerged in early 1990s in response to increased demand for short term 
credit following the spatial void created by withdrawal of mainstream banks from small loans, 
low profit margin business segment (OFT, 2010).  The convenience of fast disbursement, 
minimal or non-existent credit checks further adds to its attractiveness (FDIC, 2009).  An 
indicator of its growth pace is the extensiveness of payday loan network across the United 
States.  Payday lenders have more branch presence then McDonalds and Starbucks combined 
(Zinman, 2010).  Based on the 2009 FDIC survey, approximately four million households have 
frequented payday lenders, which is now a $38.5 billion industry (FDIC, 2009; CFSA, 2011).
11
  
Payday loan customers must be employed and banked to subscribe to these services and 
according to a survey by Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008) majority are in the moderate income 
bracket of $25,000 to $49,999.  The subscribers are mostly young, below the age of 45, married 
or living with a partner and having children below the age of 18 years. They justify these 
households’ fits the life-cycle stage where credit demand is high.     
                                                          
10  Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher (2012) provide empirical evidence on the use of ROSCA as a commitment 
device that binds households financial conduct from unnecessary spending and protect the savings against theft, 
losses or social pressures that dissipates the saved amount.  Whilst the demand for ROSCA and ASCRA is largely 
for planned endogenous events, Bouman (1995) does state that members are impelled to participate in these 
endogenous circuits to safeguard against emergency expenses arising from illness and other misfortunes.  In 
ASCRA, the insurance element is met through the disbursement of its accumulated loans. Unlike ROSCA and 
ASCRA where the member is required to make compensating payments (i.e. higher payment to compensate other 
members in a bidding ROSCA or interest on the loaned amount in ASCRA), our Model 3 (see Section 4) provides 
similar relief without the additional financial burden.    
11  In the United Kingdom, the payday loan market is estimated to be worth at £2 billion–£2.2 billion in 
2011/2012, with three players controling 57% of the total market loan value (OFT, 2013).   
5 
 
 
 The survey by Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008) find majority are infrequent users of the 
payday lending facility.  However, there is selected few; accounting for 22.5% of total surveyed 
who have 14 or more loans in the same year.  These frequent users tend to rollover the 
outstanding loan.  Generally, these loans would run for 2 weeks or less, or over a 3–4 week 
periods.  These frequent borrowers are more likely to have exposure to more than one payday 
loan, exhibiting the classic case of borrowing from Peter to pay Paul, where a loan drawn on a 
new payday lender is often used to offset against an old one.         
The primary complaints against payday lenders are the exorbitant finance charge.  Fees for 
a $100 loan ranges from $15 to $30, with annual percentage rate (APR) of 20%–300%.  The 
extremely high cost in contrast to other near credit substitutes raises criticism from consumer 
advocates and public agencies.  According to industry players, the APR is resultant from the 
small loan size, given payday lenders’ high default rates.  Industry players argue that the $15 
charge is definitely lower than the $50 flat rate returned check fees or a $25 covered overdraft 
(overdraft protection) by depository institutions (Morgan et al., 2012).     
Payday lending is a regulated industry. It is subjected to state and federal laws and some 
players also subscribe to industry standards of the Community Finance Services Association 
(CFSA); an industry self regulatory organisation (Lawrence and Elliehausen, 2008).
12
  The 
United States established a new regulatory body, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 
July 2011 to oversee matters related to consumer protection, including market conduct of payday 
loan industry.  This independent body is part of the financial reforms outlined in the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010.
13
     
Studies on payday lending have primarily centred on two aspects; namely consumer credit 
behaviours and welfare effects on the availability or withdrawal of this credit.  Skiba and 
Tobacman (2008) seek to rationalise the demand for payday loans despite its excessively high 
fees.  They find that payday loan borrowers exhibit partially naive quasi hyperbolic discounting 
tendencies. In that, the borrowers demonstrate overly optimistic forecast of future outcomes in 
respect of their own time preference, or their probability of absorbing future shocks.  
In a different study, Agarwal et al. (2009) find that the sampled population choose payday 
loans despite having unused liquidity on their credit cards.  This exemplifies existence of liquid 
                                                          
12  The industry is subjected to: (i) the Truth in Lending Act at the federal level that governs disclosure 
requirements; (ii) Fair Debt Collection Act that regulates debt collection practices; and (iii) National Bank Act that 
essentially allows the payday lender to enter into rent-a-bank model, which is now defunct by virtue of the stricter 
FDIC regulation on national chartered banks. The CFSA provides industry best practices that are essentially focused 
on consumer protection.   
13  The governing act for payday loan in the United Kingdom is the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and the industry is 
presently regulated by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). 
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 debt puzzle, whereby individuals undervalue their financial options.  This also highlights the 
individuals’ lack of cognitive ability to discern costs across different financial products.  
Gathergood (2012) points persistent indebtedness to poor financial literacy and self-control 
problems.  In such a case, individuals are more likely to succumb to impulsive consumption.  
The ease of credit provided by high-cost credit providers including payday loan, further 
exacerbates this tendency and heighten the likelihood of over-indebtedness. The study supports 
paternalistic approaches in regulations, i.e., preventing access to credit that pushes consumers to 
succumb to sub-optimal behaviour.   
In regards to its welfare effects, the evidence is still debatable.  Morse (2011) and Zinman 
(2010) to name a few, argue that accessibility to payday loan is welfare enhancing, which is in 
contrast to Skiba and Tobacman (2009) and Melzer (2011).
14
  Using the 1996 natural disaster in 
California as an event that has widespread economic effect on households, Morse (2011) finds 
that presence of payday lenders reduces emergency distress and serious criminal incidences.  
Zinman (2010) finds that restricting access creates deterioration in financial position of Oregon 
households as opposed to those domiciled in Washington, as the control state.  Households in the 
restricted payday state experienced higher unemployment and reported an overall poor future 
financial outlook.  The negative effect of the regulatory ban on payday loan is worsened by the 
lack of affordable financial substitutes.
15
  On the other hand, Melzer (2011) construct the 
presence of payday loans impairs the financial welfare of the borrowers due to the debt servicing 
burden associated with this type of credit. 
  
3. Islamic prohibition of interest and the contrast against charity 
 
Salleh et al. (2012) demonstrate that Islamic prohibition of interest in credit transactions 
(ribā an-nasi’ah) is attributed to the inclination for expropriation of wealth.  This occurs if there 
is inequity in the financial contract, thereby resulting in two equilibrium cases.  First, in the case 
of financial repression, where the real interest rate is negative the lender’s assets are 
expropriated.  Second, in case of negative leverage, where the real interest rate is greater than the 
                                                          
14  Similar to Skiba and Tobacman (2009), Morgan et al. (2012) find some corroborative evidence of decline in 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings post payday loan ban.  However, the authors opine that this require further 
examination to affirm its robustness.  
15  Thirty three states permit payday lending with rules on payday loan terms including maximum fees, rollovers, 
loan size, licensing and examination requirements as well as collection procedures for past-due loans. Seventeen 
states totally prohibit offering of payday loans.  Contrary to the United States, the United Kingdom refrains from 
adopting intrusive regulatory measures, such as stringent price controls or complete ban on the services.  The OFT 
(2010) views such controls as market disruptive. 
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 unleveraged expected return on the asset being financed, then the borrower’s assets are 
expropriated.  In the long-run, this creates imbalances or non-sustainable equilibria.  When a 
borrower defaults, this can create a domino effect, given the interconnectedness of credit 
markets.  It effectively amplifies volatility within the financial system and thus precipitates 
financial fragility, as evidenced in the ongoing financial crisis.  In extreme cases of agency costs 
of debt accruing to high project and default risks, this can lead to autarky or financial exclusion, 
with adverse impact on the underprivileged.  Their study alludes to interest-based financial 
contracts as being Pareto-inferior (or at best it is Pareto-neutral) to a hybrid form.   
Instead, the Qur’ān (the Holy Book of Islam) contrasts interest (ribā) with that of charity 
(sadaqah) (see verses 2:276-277, 30-39).  Charity, as defined in the practice of Prophet 
Muhammad PBUH (Sunnah), is not only concerned with financial forms but also all types of 
good deeds (Sahih Al-Bukhari Vol. 2, 24:144; Sahih Muslim Vol. 3, 12:2329–2330).
16
  Piety 
through charitable deeds inculcates a sense of brotherhood and advances social welfare. As 
highlighted by Bremer (2004, p.7), “Charities ...provided a source of support for institutions and 
interest groups independent of, and sometimes in opposition, to the state.  Islamic charities have 
historically played an additional role in society, that of promoter of decentralized economic 
development. ...In this respect, they reflect the blending of religious and secular, the social and 
economic, that is the key characteristic of the Islamic idea”.  From a moral perspective, Ibn 
Taymiyyah (1951), the great Islamic scholar, argues the element of charity cements social 
cohesiveness, whilst usury factionalises society.   
The Qur’ān censures the practice of creditors, who cumulate the amount due for every 
delay in settlement that leads to further financial hardship on the debtor.  Instead, it calls for the 
creditor to grant respite to the borrower such that, if the creditor were to forfeit the amount 
owed, this reflects a higher order of virtuousness, and will be rightly rewarded (verse 2:280).  
Unsurprisingly, the prohibition of interest is also enjoined in the religious books of Islam’s sister 
religions, i.e., Judaism and Christianity (see Cornell, 2006).  
Both the Qur’ān and Sunnah have specific references for assisting the underprivileged.  
The financial forms of charity can be broadly categorised into zakāt (social welfare funds), waqf 
(philanthropic foundations) coupled with qard (interest-free loan) or salaf (synonymous with 
interest-free loan).  Zakāt forms one of the five pillars of Islam and is obligatory on one’s wealth 
for the benefit of the recipients identified in the Qur’ān (verse 9:60).  Of interest is the specific 
directive for financial resources to be allotted for the poor and needy.  Although waqf (awqāf, 
                                                          
16  Although Islam enjoins charitable deeds, it prohibits begging, for it is best to be actively employed to uplift 
one’s economic status (Sahih Al-Bukhari Vol. 2, 24:1470–1471; Sahih Muslim Vol. 3, 12:2396, 2400 and 2404). 
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 plural) is not mentioned specifically in the Qur’ān, it plays an instrumental role in Islamic 
civilisation.  The earliest records on the practice of waqf can be traced to the Ottoman Empire in 
the eight century (Cizakca, 2000).  It is said that these philanthropic foundations were able to 
financially support the provision of social services in Muslim society at that time, and in turn 
help address economic disparity.  Such practice involved the endowment of privately owned 
properties for charitable purposes in perpetuity.  The revenue generated by the waqf is then 
utilised according to its objects.   
Qard signifies the extension of loan to a borrower from one’s resources without 
expectation of gains, whereby the lender forfeits the use of his resources during the loaned 
period.  Such is its prominence that it is ranked higher than charity and even equated as a loan to 
God himself (verses 2:245; 5:12; 57:11 and 18; 64:17; 73:20).
17
  This benevolent loan is also 
synonymous with salaf that connotes the extension of a loan, subject to repayment at a later time 
(Al-Zuhayli, 2003).   
From a fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) perspective, jurists are divided on the rights of the 
lender on the terms of the loan.  Two widely opposing views are that a lender has absolute rights 
to recall the loan at anytime, whilst others view that it is permissible for the lender to stipulate 
the loaned period and hence, both contracting parties should abide by it (see Al-Zuhayli, 2003 on 
the debate by the four major Sunni schools of thought).  This ambiguity in the Shari’ah 
interpretation can cause adverse repercussions in current financial context that warrants property 
rights certainty.
18
  Underdevelopment of the fiqh provides ammunition to critique Islamic law 
(see Kuran, 2011).   
Despite these shortcomings, there is documented evidence where qard is deployed as a 
funding mechanism in modern financial dealings.  Ebrahim (2009) finds the well-to-do members 
of clans in Oman informally granting interest-free loans (qard) to their destitute clan members 
for home purchase.  In the same study, he explores the potential of formalising interest-free 
solutions for long-term real estate financing.  Other studies on interest-free structures include 
Darrat and Ebrahim (1999) who focus on open market operation instrument in a partial 
equilibrium framework of qard-based Malaysian Government Investment Certificates.  There 
are also existing practices such as the National Australia Bank (Australia) no interest loan 
schemes, Akhuwat (Pakistan) no interest microfinance and JAK Members Bank (Sweden). 
                                                          
17  Ali (2002) connotes qard to “spending in the cause of God” (footnote 710, p.245).  A benevolent loan does not 
exempt the borrower from honouring the debt.  The severity of non-repayment is highlighted in the Sunnah whereby 
even a martyr who is forgiven for every sin is still bound by his debt (Sahih Muslim Vol. 5, 33:4883–4884).   
18  Earliest record on employment of qard by Az-Zubair also does not allude to its form and activity in which it 
was deployed (Sahih Al-Bukhari Vol. 4, 57:3129). 
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 Our model explores alternative platforms for deployment of this form of financing and 
augments present studies and actual practices mentioned above.  Furthermore, the employment 
of interest-free element emphasised in our paper provides a direct contrast to current payday 
usurious facility.  More importantly, according to religious injunction, if the expected return (r) 
on funds is gradually restrained to zero (moving from re to r′e and finally 0), the supply of funds 
(S) will contract to a level where funding disappears (see Figure 1 below).  This is the probable 
reason why scholars like Fazlur Rahman (1964) compartmentalises this form of funding to only 
philanthropic endeavours.  However, this study demonstrates that lending is revived by 
embedding the interest-free credit facility within a circuit, which promotes group insurance.  
This is because members help each other when faced by misfortunes (exogenous liquidity 
shocks).   
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
4. Model development 
 
This section details the mathematical design of an efficient interest-free short term payday 
loan facility (using endogenous leverage) to address the inter-temporal liquidity needs of payday 
loan borrowers.  Our endogenous leveraged circuit is founded in the works of institutional 
economics (Commons, 1931), and builds from the technology of ROSCA (Besley et al., 1993; 
Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher, 2012), its associated hybrids; namely, ASCRA (Bouman, 1995), 
and the more contemporary mutual and financial cooperative (Ebrahim, 2009).  Besides liquidity 
transformation, the circuit features akin to an Islamic insurance (takāful) or mutual scheme 
where members guarantee each other from unexpected damage, losses or misfortune (Bouman, 
1995).   
Furthermore, unlike other endogenous leverage groupings, liquidity constrained members 
of the circuit receive short term interest-free payday loans, which is repaid at their next payday 
date.  Our model expounds the elements that need to be observed if an interest-free loan that is 
enjoined in Islam is to have a profound impact in any financial development schemes.  Here, we 
demonstrate that this endogenous interest-free payday loan circuit integrated with appropriate 
constraints that circumvent adverse selection and moral hazard can be Pareto efficient or at least 
neutral to that of its competitor, i.e., payday lender and mainstream financier. 
The interest-free payday loan circuit is structured as follows.  Individuals are required to 
become members by contributing monthly to a common pool of funds, i.e., circuit members.  In 
our model, members are risk neutral, and the demand for liquidity or payday loan is treated as 
10 
 
 
 exogenous.  Members can only apply for the interest-free loan, i.e., borrow, after qualifying a 
defined period of membership.  This gestation period has a two-fold effect.  First, it allows the 
circuit to identify and assist the member in realisation of her/his financial goals.  Second, it 
allows member to build up equity cushion through their monthly contributions.  This effectively 
binds the member to the circuit and addresses member time-inconsistent preferences.  In addition 
to these two covenants, other mandatory rulings to address adverse selection and moral hazard 
issues (i.e., default cost) include requirement for (i) direct deposit of member paycheque into the 
circuit; and (ii) existence of loan guarantor (see detailed explanation below).  Furthermore, once 
a member borrows from the circuit, she/he is required to undergo financial planning program to 
enhance her/his financial literacy.  This helps errant members to plan ahead, alleviate future 
liquidity crises and stay debt free.   
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
A stylised depiction of the models set up is summarised in Figure 2.  This comprises of a 
basic institutional framework and two stepped extensions that embeds real-world practicalities.  
Model 1 (see Limb A of Figure 2) illustrates the basic structure of our efficient interest-free 
endogenous leverage circuit across a one period cycle.  Here, all circuit members are savers and 
also liquidity constrained borrowers. This conforms to a self-insurance scheme.  The extension 
to this basic framework is provided in Models 2 and 3 (see again Limbs A and B of Figure 2).  In 
Model 2, we relax the simultaneity in borrowing needs.  That is, only fraction of members will 
borrow to tide their liquidity shortfall.  Model 3 further relaxes the elements whereby there is 
random multi-period borrowing that in the long-run approaches a steady state.  As shown in 
Figure 2 in the case of defaulting borrowers, the circuit retains the accumulated contributions or 
savings of the defaulters.  Otherwise, they receive their savings net of the amount loaned.  On 
the other hand, non-borrowing members are entitled to their savings.   
For all three models, we implicitly assume the existence of an information architecture, 
where property rights needed for the forthcoming paycheque to serve as collateral, accurate 
methods of verifying or evaluating members’ income and bankruptcy procedures are well 
established (see Levine et al., 2000).  Individuals joining the circuit are assumed to have limited 
asset qualifying collateral and void of other alternative credit solutions, would have to subscribe 
to current high cost payday loan.  Each of the circuit members receives an exogenous flow of 
income.  The above assumptions are representative of the stylised facts of payday loan 
borrowers’ demographics (see Lawrence and Elliehausen, 2008; FDIC, 2009).    
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 4a. Model 1: Institutional basic framework where all members are both savers and 
liquidity constrained borrowers  
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
(i) As depicted in Figure 3, each member is required to make periodic monthly contributions 
‘C’ into a pooled fund, from time i = -m (at the point of membership) to i = 1 (the circuit 
terminal date).  Here, we adopt monthly contributions to maintain consistency with 
members’ income stream, i.e., paycheques are generally issued on monthly basis.  By 
instituting periodic contribution, we: (i) alleviate adverse selection, as it reveals the 
financial status of the prospective borrower through her/his income level (especially during 
the gestation period) as illustrated in the income constraint (see Equations (5)-(5a) below 
and also Akerlof, 1970); (ii) assist in long-run accumulation of wealth that minimises 
exposures to exogenous income shocks; (iii) initiate an equity buffer that minimises the 
likelihood of the member to strategically default on her/his borrowing (see Foote et al., 
2008); and most importantly (iv) implement a commitment device that moderates self-
control issues associated with payday loan borrowers (see Skiba and Tobacman, 2008; 
Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher, 2012). 
We also alleviate moral hazard element by: (i) instituting a loan constraint (see Equations 
(6), (6a) and (6b) and also Ebrahim, 2009); (ii) implementing a collateral constraint in the 
form of a co-signer (see also Stiglitz, 1990); and (iii) integrating compulsory financial 
programs that enhances the financial status of the member requesting funds from the 
cooperative (see Bernheim and Garret, 2003). 
The accumulated periodic contribution, represented by ‘S’, forms the capital base of this 
circuit and is used to meet short term financial needs of liquidity constrained members.
19
  
This is given in Equation (1), where ‘m’ denotes the month building up to the 
disbursement of the interest-free payday loan facility. 



t
mi
mtCCS )1(
 
(1) 
When 1t  (as in Models 1 and 2), this culminates into  
                                                          
19  To assist in the circuit start up and reduce the lag in time to loan disbursement, the circuit may employ seed 
funding from charitable funds (e.g. zakāt and sadaqah funds).  Ideally for long-run stability, this charitable fund 
should be institutionalised and performs the central role of providing liquidity relief to individual circuits that may 
suffer from unforeseen shocks.  This is akin to the Verband, associative level of the German cooperative banking 
system (Biasin, 2010). 
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 


1
)2(
mi
mCCS  (1a)     
(ii) After satisfying the minimum gestation period, liquidity constrained members qualify to 
draw ‘Q’ interest-free payday loan from the circuit at time i = 1-n (see Figure 3), where ‘n’ 
is a fraction of a month (i.e., n < 1 month).
20
  The interest-free facility resembles a bullet 
loan, where total repayment of principal ‘Q’ is made at terminal time i = 1.  The loan 
repayment is net of the accumulated contributions ‘S’. 
 SQ   (2) 
(iii) To account for the opportunity cost of capital employed within the circuit, ‘C’ and ‘Q’ are 
discounted by ‘γ’.  That is, the monthly discount rate comprises of an imputed return ‘r’, 
which is equivalent to the average cost of fund incurred in mainstream credit market.   
 r

1
1
  < 1,  r > 0 (3)  
(iv) We also incorporate the fractional transaction cost ‘ζ’ associated with administering the 
circuit, eg. management of members’ contributions and loan processing (Kontolaimou and 
Tsekouras, 2010), and fraction default ‘α’ (Jaffee and Russell, 1976).21, 22  It should be 
noted that this fractional default ‘α’ represents the proportion of defaulters (ex-post any 
recoveries from respective loan guarantors) from the circuit’s total population of 
borrowers.  The circuit efficiency is contingent on minimising transaction costs and 
default, as they can fritter away the circuit’s gains or cause erosion to its capital base 
(Coase, 1937; Alchian, 1950).  Both outflows are moderated by presence of covenants 
discussed below.  Additionally, the circuit also retains right of recourse on defaulting 
borrowers’ savings ‘αS’.   
In line with the circuit’s objectives, the discounted ‘γ’ contributions and interest-free loan 
after accounting for transaction ‘ζ’ costs and default ‘α’, coupled with net loan payoff, 
given by Equation (4) should at least be equal or greater than zero.  
  
                                                          
20  This implies members face liquidity problems before their next paycheque. 
21  The institutional structure of the circuit already minimises upfront transaction costs compared to current 
payday lenders, as it: (i) benefits from non-profit motive management force; (ii) does not incur external funding 
costs; and (iii) is not bound to issue investment returns to its ‘depositors’.   
22  Intuitively, utility derived from an interest-free credit facility would be higher than subscribing to high cost 
current payday loans or face credit rationing from mainstream credit.  Therefore in such situations, we foresee that 
the (non) pecuniary costs associated with default penalty should be significantly severe such that it impels 
repayment of the loan (see Skiba and Tobacman (2008) for empirical evidence of the degree of reliance of these 
borrowers on payday loans for their liquidity needs).   
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Substituting ‘S’ in Equation (1) into Equation (4) gives us:  
             012211...11 11    mCQQC nmm  (4a) 
The periodic contribution in Equation (4a) form a geometric series that can be further 
simplified as follows: 
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(4b) 
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(4c) 
Potential maximum loan is, 
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(4d) 
To alleviate the risk of adverse selection and moral hazard, it is imperative for the circuit 
to institute covenants as follows: 
(i) Income and loan constraint:  Each member is subjected to an after tax income test ‘y’ to 
ascertain her/his capacity to meet her/his periodic contribution and loan obligation.  This 
not only supports responsible lending (Carr and Kolluri, 2001), but also moderates the 
adverse selection and moral hazard issues (Jaffee and Russell, 1976).  The member’s 
financial capacity is represented by a multiple ‘b’ of her/his income and loan.   
                                                          
23  The circuit structure is designed to be contribution and time invariant for each member joining the pooled 
fund.  That is, each member is required to make periodic monthly contributions to the pooled fund ‘C’ from the 
point of membership at time i = –m to the circuit terminal date, i = 1 (in the case of Models 1 and 2) and i = T (in 
the case of Model 3) (refer Equations (1) and (1a)).  This similarly applies to the aggregated member contributions.  
Consequently, this does not affect the outcome of Equation (4).   
24  Each term in Equation (4) signifies either a cash inflow (represented by a positive sign) or an outflow 
(represented by a negative sign).  Each of these terms is discounted by ‘𝛾’ that comprises an imputed return ‘𝑟’, 
which is equivalent to the average cost of fund incurred in mainstream credit market.  This is a standard treatment of 
discounting in finance to account for the opportunity cost of capital (i.e. next best investment avenue forgone by the 
members).  The first term thus represents the discounted value of member contributions, while the third term 
represents that of payback of loans disbursed (netted against their aggregate contributions) after adjusting for 
defaults. 
Discounted monthly 
contributions net 
transaction costs 
Receipt of member 
monthly 
contributions 
Disbursement of 
interest-free payday 
loan to liquidity 
constrained members 
(borrowers) 
Repayment of 
non-defaulting 
borrowers’ 
savings net of 
outstanding loan  
Retention of 
defaulting 
borrowers’ 
savings  
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 (ia) Income constraint ‘b1’ 
Here, the income constraint ‘b1’ curtails the contribution ‘C’ and thus mitigates adverse 
selection.  This is simplified as follows:  
1b
C
y
 , which can be rewritten 
1b
y
C   (5)  
1
max
b
y
C   (5a) 
(ib) Loan constraint ‘b2’
25, 26
 
Here, the loan constraint ‘b2’ curtails the loan amount ‘Q’ and thus mitigates moral hazard.  
This is simplified as follows: 
2b
Q
y
 , which can be rewritten 
2b
y
Q   (6) 
Here,






  ntntBinding Q
b
y
Q max,
2
, ,min , where  ntnt QQQ   ,2max1maxmax, ,min  (6a) 
1maxQ  is defined in Models 1–3 (sections 4a–4c) respectively by Equations (4d), (7e) and 
(16d), while ntQ ,2max  reflects the resource constraint of the circuit given by 
  mtCQ nt  1,2max . 
If transaction cost is low, i.e., max
2
Q
b
y
 , then 
2
,
b
y
Q ntBinding   (6b) 
(ii) Pre-commitment constraint:  Members are subjected to salary deduction to moderate time 
inconsistent preference tendencies (Skiba and Tobacman, 2008; Dagnelie and LeMay-
Boucher, 2012) and moral hazard.  With this, it partially limits the member consumption 
options available in the future.  This seamless transfer of member income to the circuit and 
subsequent settlement of the interest-free payday loan has a secondary effect of lowering 
transaction costs of the circuit. 
(iii) Collateral constraint:  Given the potential limited ability of these households to raise asset 
qualifying collateral, disbursement of the interest-free payday loan is then subjected to a 
reputable co-signer, who provides surety upon default by the member.  The co-signer, who 
has local information compared to the circuit, is in a preferred position to conduct ex-post 
                                                          
25  This is consistent with Ebrahim (2009). 
26  The interest-free payday loan facility is strictly for managing inter-temporal liquidity shocks faced by its 
members.  In tandem with this objective, ‘Q’ should therefore be confined to a reasonable multiple of its members’ 
monthly after tax income.  This helps alleviate debt entrapment, discussed in Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008) and 
OFT (2013). Nonetheless, our model can still be adapted to reflect allowances for this restriction.    
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 monitoring and impose social sanctions (see Stiglitz, 1990).
27
  This then, significantly 
reduces costly state verification issues, particularly in dealings with low net worth 
members. However, failure of the co-signer to act accordingly can have a detrimental 
effect on the circuit efficiency/ sustainability (see Guinanne, 1994 on demise of Irish credit 
union).  
(iv) Financial capability constraint: Each member who borrows is required to undergo 
personal finance program (eg. money management, asset building and debt management) 
to enhance their financial capability (Agarwal et al., 2009; Gathergood, 2012).
28
  This non-
pecuniary cost of borrowing is an interventionist measure that has its roots in behavioural 
finance, as it seeks to influence the cognitive psychology of payday borrowers with 
regards to their financial conduct (see Bernheim and Garrett, 2003 on the positive long-
term behavioural effects of increased exposure to financial education).
29
  
 
Proposition 1. For the circuit to be competitive, its net surplus must satisfy the efficiency 
condition given by Equation (4c)
 30
 
 
Equation (4c) signifies three possible states of the circuit.  First, when the circuit fulfils the 
equality sign, the circuit is at best Pareto-neutral to its competitors, namely mainstream 
financiers.
31
   Second, if the inequality sign is satisfied, the circuit is then Pareto-superior to its 
competitors.  The surplus capital signifies welfare improvement of an initially liquidity 
constrained group.  Third, if Equation (4c) is unmet, then the circuit is Pareto-inferior with 
erosion in its capital base, and its continued sustainability is doubtful.  Here, its sustainability is 
contingent on minimising transaction costs and defaults, as both erode the circuit’s gains and 
ultimately its capital base.  Therefore, the circuit administrators must institute controls, so that 
                                                          
27  The collateral covenant should not be a major participation constraint in lieu that members are required to be 
economically active.  The co-signer can be from or outside the circuit. Where the co-signer is also a member of the 
circuit, co-signing incentivises peer monitoring, in view that the sustainability of the circuit ultimately affects the 
interest of the co-signer (Stiglitz, 1990).  
28  Our model can accommodate the funding for the personal finance program through the transaction costs ‘𝜁’ in 
the administration of the circuit.  This can also be complemented by financial education public policy programs or 
specific workplace schemes.   
29  Other interventionist measures, which are pecuniary in nature, are to gradually: (i) decrease b1, and (ii) 
increase b2, thereby compelling erring borrowers to save and avoid debt entrapment.  This can be extended in our 
model to incorporate real world practicalities.    
30  Our analysis is rationalised based on a standard Net Present Value analysis employed in Financial 
Management (see Brealey et al., 2011).  We have not provided a formal proof as it is a normal practice in the field 
to discount cash flows of alternate ways of funding a project in order to evaluate an efficient scheme.  This approach 
is also adopted by Ebrahim (2009).   
31  We can also deduce that the circuit is Pareto-superior to that of contemporary payday loan, in view of the 
latter’s high cost of funds.  
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 both costs are reduced significantly.  This is achieved through various covenants and retention of 
defaulting member savings as highlighted earlier.  
 
4b. Model 2: Impute real-world element by relaxing the borrowing condition in that only 
a fraction of members ‘λ’ borrow from the endogenous circuit  
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 As in Model 1, members are required to contribute ‘C’ on monthly basis upon entry, at i = 
-m to i = 1 period.  The following similarly hold in Model 2: (i) the circuit has a defined period, 
i.e., one-period cycle until i = 1, after which it terminates; (ii) variables defined in Equations (1), 
(2), (3) and (4); (iii) transaction costs and default; and (iv) the four covenants (i.e., income, pre-
commitment, collateral and financial capability).   However, Model 2 specification differs from 
previous in that it conceives the likelihood of liquidity strained members may occur at different 
circuit cycles.  Therefore, at any one time, there are a fraction of borrowers signified by ‘λ’ that 
are supported by ‘(1-λ)’ lenders or non-borrowers (see Figure 4). This clearly depicts the 
‘transformation service’ provided by the circuit, whereby the temporary idle funds of a 
proportion of members (lenders or non-borrowers) are used to provide liquidity to others who 
suffer from exogenous inter-temporal income shocks.  This improves on “competitive market by 
providing better risk sharing among people who need to consume at different random times” 
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, p.402). 
As with the previous section, observance of ‘C’ entitles member a right to draw on the 
circuit funds if she/he faces liquidity squeeze.  We find the technology of the circuit in Model 2 
best resembles the practice of mutual or Islamic insurance (takāful), where members agree to 
indemnify each other against a defined loss.  Based on the concept of solidarity, members of the 
group contribute to a specified fund that entitles each person to protection on occurrence of the 
loss event.  The commercial implementation of this concept of mutuality can be traced to the 
eight century, where sea merchants would initiate a pool to protect themselves against perils 
during their voyages (Alhabshi and Razak, 2011).
32
   A characteristic that differentiates mutual/ 
Islamic insurance from the mainstream is that, in the former, each member is the insurer and also 
insured, which means there is risk sharing between members rather than risk shifting. 
                                                          
32  Although there is no direct reference to takāful in Islamic scriptures, the concept finds support in the Qur’ānic 
verses and Sunnah that call for upholding of brotherhood and solidarity in times of hardship (Qur’ān 5:2; Sahih 
Muslim Vol. 6, 45: 6585–6590, 45:6669–6674).     
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 Based on the above extension (see Figure 4), total borrowings in the circuit are now 
signified by ‘λQ’.  At time i = 1, i.e., expiry of the circuit cycle, (a) non-defaulting borrowers are 
required to settle the outstanding interest-free payday loan net of their savings ‘λ(1-α)(Q-S)’; and 
(b) any defaulting borrowers will have their accumulated contributions or savings retained 
within the circuit ‘λαS’.  The proportion of non-borrowing members are then entitled to a 
payback of their accumulated contributions constituting ‘(1-λ)S’.33  Equation (7) is a 
modification of Equation (4), as it incorporates the fraction of borrowing and non-borrowing 
members. 
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Substituting ‘S’ in Equation (1) into Equation (7a) gives us:  
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(7b) 
This is further simplified as follows: 
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(7c) 
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(7d) 
Potential maximum loan is, 
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(7e) 
 
Proposition 2. The efficiency condition of the circuit with fraction of members who are 
borrowers is contingent on satisfaction of Equation (7d) 
 
                                                          
33  In our model, a member’s primary objective in joining the circuit is to ensure access to low cost credit, i.e., 
maximise borrowing opportunity, in contrast to high cost credit from payday lenders or financial rationing.  Given 
the above motivation, we have not incorporated dividends or investment returns on the accumulated contributions 
(savings) as these may be better served by existing financial intermediaries. 
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 The three efficiency states described earlier in Proposition 1 apply in Proposition 2.  This 
is even with the added complexity, where not all members will borrow during the same circuit 
cycle.  The circuit can ensure that it satisfies the inequality sign in Equation (7d) by enhancing 
its predictive ability on probability of liquidity calls by its members.  This is closely associated 
with the principle law of large numbers employed in insurance pricing.  By collating sufficiently 
large number of exposures, the randomness in the occurrence of the exposures will statistically 
converge towards a defined mean with a given variance, which then allows insurers to fairly 
predict the frequency and severity of their exposures and price the insurance products 
accordingly.  In the case of the circuit, it can then correctly determine the loan amount and 
tenure that is feasible to limit liquidity gaps at the end of the circuit cycle.  
       
4c. Model 3: Extends further the real-world element whereby there is random borrowing 
over multi-periods that in the long-run approaches a steady state 
 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
We further extend the model to allow for multi-period endogenous leverage, where 
members pool their endowments across time, in order to assure accessibility to short-term 
interest-free payday loan, in light of unexpected contingencies (see Figure 5).  This brings the 
circuit nearer to that of contemporary financial cooperatives (Ebrahim, 2009).  Here, we have a 
random process of member borrowing. This discrete-parameter Markov chain of {Xt-n, t>n} is 
represented by:  
 )/(),....,,/( 122111 tntnttntnnnt iXjXPiXiXiXjXP    (8)  
 Equation (8) essentially assumes a member’s future borrowing behaviour is a 
consideration of only her/his present behaviour, and is independent of the member’s past history.  
The initial probability vector ‘pt-n’ is denoted by probability of borrowing ‘λt-n’ and non-
borrowing ‘1-λt-n’, respectively: 
  ntntntp    1  (9) 
We also assume during the next interval that there is a probability ‘ρt+1-n’ that members 
borrow and ‘1-ρt+1-n’ otherwise.  The two-state Markov chain transition probability matrix is 
illustrated below. 
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The above two-state transition matrix converges in steady state as follows (see Hsu, 2011). 
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 This matrix in Equation (10a) is further simplified using the well-known Bayes’ rule, as 
illustrated in the Appendix, where we realise 
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 The long-run borrowing behaviour converges to a steady state ‘ ˆ ’. That is, there exists a 
stationary distribution for the Markov chain.  This is found by solving  
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(11) 
 Where,  21ˆ ssp  , and 121  ss   (12) 
 Equation (11) can then be rewritten as follows:  
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Solving the matrix, we obtain two equations described below: 
Equation 1 
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21 ss ,  ρ ≠ 1   (14a) 
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 Equation 2 
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21 ss ,  ρ ≠ 1   (15a) 
 Thus, both Equations (14a) and (15a) lead to the same solution, implying the exogeneity of 
‘ρ’.  By substituting ‘s
1
’ in Equation (14a) into Equation (12), we get  
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(15b) 
 








1
1
1 2s  
  12s , and hence  1s   (15c) 
Thus, restating ‘ ˆ ’ of Equation (12) with the results derived in Equation (15c) gives us 
the steady state matrix as follows: 
    1ˆ   (15d) 
 
Proposition 3. A member borrowing behaviour is contingent on her/his past borrowing 
history. 
 
We find member borrowing behaviour is path dependent, which corroborates the empirical 
evidence documented in Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008).  Despite this intricate issue of path 
dependency, we can still determine the loans to be underwritten by exploiting the property of 
steady state, where a fraction ‘λ’ of the population borrow (irrespective of previous borrowing).  
For mathematical tractability and aligned with Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008), we assume 
borrowers who do not redeem their loans would continuously rollover their facility. Therefore, 
default emerges only at terminal period ‘T’ (see Figure 5 and Equation (16)).  All other variables 
and covenants remain the same.  
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       011  SSSQT 
 
(16) 
 
 
 
We substitute ‘ S ’ from Equation (1) into Equation (16) and simplify it to derive 
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Potential maximum loan is, 
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Proposition 4. The efficiency condition of a circuit with borrowing by a fraction of 
members across multi-periods is contingent on satisfaction of Equation (16c) 
 
The efficiency states detailed in Proposition 1 similarly applies for Proposition 4.  We find 
that the circuit’s efficiency can be improved in a multi-period model.  A circuit that is conducted 
repeatedly over a series of periods will have greater latitude on its borrowing policy, as each 
borrower’s financial conduct is fully revealed (Hosios and Peters, 1989).  By instituting renewal 
model that is dependent on the member’s financial conduct, the circuit effectively addresses 
conflict of interest between borrowers and non-borrowers.  In this situation, each member will 
Repayment of non-
defaulting borrowers’ 
savings net of 
outstanding loan  
Retention of 
defaulting 
borrowers’ 
savings  
Repayment 
of non-
borrowers’ 
savings 
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 endeavour to undertake fewer risks, which would potentially affect access to future liquidity 
facility.  Credible threat of sanctions in multi-period states can also reduce moral hazard 
(Stiglitz, 1990). 
 
 
4c(1). Numerical illustration 
  
 Using Equations (4d), (7e) and (16d), we conduct a mathematical simulation to enumerate 
the breakeven level of the interest-free payday loan in each of the three models.  The circuit 
exogenous factors encompass: (i) member income profile y; (ii) cost of fund prevailing in 
mainstream credit market r; (iii) transaction costs and default ζ and α; (iv) loan tenure and 
drawdown period n and t; (v) underwriting constraint corresponding to the income multiple b1 
and b2; (vi) gestation period prior to loan drawdown m; (vii) fraction of borrowing members λ; 
and (viii) substantive circuit life T.  We use the observations by Lawrence and Elliehausen 
(2008) and the FDIC (2010) to check the reasonableness of the exogenous parameters.  Overall, 
the final values of the exogenous parameters are set to avoid excessive financial burden and 
ensure a liberal round of liquidity cycle, until member reaches financial security.     
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 We tabulate the efficiency scenarios, given various permutations of the endogenous 
parameters, which cover (i) maximum member monthly contribution: Cmax; (ii) maximum 
accumulated savings: Smax; and (iii) potential maximum loan: Qmax.  Table 1 illustrates the effect 
on the endogenous factors, given changes in the exogenous parameters.  This provides an 
indicative pricing framework that can be emulated in the design of similar endogenous leveraged 
circuits.  It highlights the sensitivity of each endogenous factor to the decisions that the circuit 
undertakes and the various levers that may be combined to enhance the circuit efficiency.   
 Additionally, Table 2 provides the resultant values of the endogenous parameters, which 
assure that the circuit satisfies the Pareto-efficiency propositions under Models 1–3.  Model 3 
further demonstrates the interplay of the loan constraint covenant between 
2b
y
 or Qmax, where 
Qmax is characterised by the lower of either Qmax1 or Qmax2, t-n.   Here, QBinding demands balancing 
the twin issues of: (i) protecting the member from potential debt entrapment; and (ii) ensuring 
the circuit’s long-run liquidity, i.e., solvency.  By not pursuing aggressive loan disbursement 
policies, it promotes accumulation of equity buffer that would ultimately allow the circuit greater 
financial latitude to pursue financial policies that enhance member welfare within the reasonable 
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 risk tolerance limits, eg. relaxing the ‘QBinding’ constraint and undertaking loan rehabilitation 
program that customises the loan repayment tenure for genuinely financially constrained 
member.        
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 Based on Equation (16d), we extend the simulation to illustrate the effect of transaction 
cost on the potential loan amount, while holding other exogenous factors constant (see Figure 
6).
34
  Premised on the loan covenant in Equation (6) with loan multiple of 102 b  and monthly 
after tax income of 000,2$y , 
2b
y
is then fixed at $200.  On the other hand, ‘Qmax’ changes with 
variation in the transaction cost ‘ζ’, i.e., there exists an inverse relationship between ‘Qmax’ and 
‘ζ’. ‘ BindingQ ’ as given in Equation (6a) is the minimum of either
2b
y
 or Qmax.  As highlighted in 
Equation (6b), if the transaction cost is low, i.e., MaxQ
b
y

2
, then
2b
y
QBinding  .  Otherwise, 
QBinding is restrained by Qmax. The critical transaction load, whereby 
2b
y
 = Qmax, is when
%7.28 , which is signified in Figure 6 by critical . 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Payday borrowers are categorically those who suffer from poor credit history, exhibit time-
inconsistent preferences and are often precluded by mainstream financiers.  The prohibitive 
payday loan rates may potentially lead into a debt cycle if the borrower fails to observe the 
repayment term.  Despite the unfavourable publicity against payday loans, financially 
constrained households still succumb to its services.  This underlines a latent need for 
inexpensive short term liquidity facility to bridge their liquidity needs.   
Unlike previous studies on payday loans, this study undertakes to conceptualise a solution 
to usurious payday loans and address credit rationing in mainstream credit.  It entails the design 
of an institutional structure that embeds the interplay of cost efficient organisations and cultural 
beliefs.  Our model is based on risk-neutral economic agents within an endogenous leverage 
circuit that draws from the technology of member based institutions such as ROSCA and its 
                                                          
34  Exogenous factors are: y = $2,000, m = 6 months, r = 15%, α = 10%, λ = 0.4, T = 180 months, and t = 1. 
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 hybrids, i.e., ASCRA, mutual and financial cooperative.  A unique feature of this structure is that 
it harnesses the concept of coalition of savers and borrowers to allay inter-temporal liquidity 
shocks faced by its members, through the deployment of interest-free payday loan.         
Our study illustrates the employment of this antiquated charitable form in contemporary 
financial perspective.  This credit modality is chosen for its contrast with current payday loans.  
Furthermore, it is held esteemed in religious tenets, which specifically distinguish such deeds 
from usurious practices. We demonstrate that the circuit performs favourably in contrast to 
current usurious payday loans.  First, the interest-free facility averts expropriation of wealth, an 
issue associated with payday loans.  The periodic contribution, which features a minimal fraction 
of members’ salary, promotes asset building which should consequently improve their financial 
security in the long-run.  Second, our member based endogenous circuit allows credit 
accessibility to these households who are financially rationed by mainstream financiers.  Third, 
we attest the economic proposition of interest-free loans expounded in religious teachings in 
current financial settings, whereby the circuit is able to boot strap its resources to grow 
endogenously.  Fourth, in line with documented studies of time-inconsistent preferences of these 
households, the institutional design of our interest-free payday loan relies on the commitment 
technologies advocated with circuit-based structures.  
The efficiency of an endogenous leveraged circuit is contingent on observing risk control 
measures to constraint adverse selection and moral hazard, thus reducing default and transaction 
costs significantly.  This builds on ensuring equitable commitment, i.e., the periodic contribution 
can be fulfilled without jeopardising financial interests of individual members and the circuit.  
This is followed through by requiring the commitment to be directly dispensed into the circuit, 
which would effectively pre-empt irrational consumption tendencies.  This is fortified with 
programs that build the members’ financial capability and route them from poor credit 
tendencies.  Next, we require existence of co-signer that acts in absence of standard collateral.  
Here, the co-signer’s central role is in reducing costly state verification and execution of credible 
sanctions.  The institutional design of the circuit provides upfront dilution of transaction costs 
that directly feeds into promoting the circuit efficiency.   
Given the circuit technology that is member driven, accumulation of substantive capital 
base may create lag in time to loan issuance.  To manage the gestation period, the circuit may 
rely on seed funding from zakāt and sadaqah to reinforce its initial capital base. These charitable 
funds can also be institutionalised to provide safety net to the circuit that defrays any long-run 
sustainability issues.  Alternatively, the interest-free loan facility can be integrated into an 
already operational circuit, eg. financial cooperative.  Results of our study support the policy 
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 direction of the FDIC’s (2010) small-dollar loan program.  That is, it promotes affordable credit, 
observes risk-based underwriting, maximises technology and automation, integrates savings 
component in combination with financial education.  Last, our model sets an indicative pricing 
mechanism, mostly absent in charitable institutions, which in the long-run promotes self-
sufficiency.  
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 Appendix 
 
A. Proof  
 
We employ conditional probability premised on Bayes’ rule with notations B: Borrow and 
NB: No Borrow, respectively to derive at: 
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Subsequent reiterations yield the following in steady state: 
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Subsequent reiterations yield the following in the steady state: 
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 B. Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Supply and demand of funds with changes to the expected returns.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Stylised depiction of the various scenarios for Models 1-3.  
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Figure 3.  All members are savers and also liquidity constrained borrowers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  A fraction of liquidity constrained members borrow from the circuit ‘λ’ and 
supported by ‘1-λ’ non-borrowing members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  A fraction of liquidity constrained members borrow from the circuit ‘λ’ across 
multi-periods that in the long-run approaches a steady state. 
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Figure 6. Effect of transaction cost on the circuit potential maximum loan.  
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 C. Tables 
 
Table 1. Indicative pricing structure of the endogenous interest-free payday loan circuit  
 
Increase in exogenous factor 
Direction of change in endogenous factor 
Cmax Smax Qmax 
y + + + 
b1 + + + 
b2 uc uc + 
r uc uc + 
ζ uc uc – 
α – – – 
m + + + 
n uc uc – 
λ uc uc – 
T uc uc + 
Notes: Direction of change in the endogenous values ‘+’ increase; ‘–’decrease, and ‘uc’ unchanged. 
 
Table 2. Results illustrating circuit Pareto-efficiency for each model  
 
Model 1  
b1 b2 r ζ α m n Cmax Smax Qmax1 QBinding  
100 10 12% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 20 160 1,045 200  
      ⅓   960   
  15% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 20 160 1,228 200  
      ⅓   1,113   
50 10 12% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 40 320 2,091 200  
      ⅓   1,921   
  15% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 40 320 2,456 200  
      ⅓   2,226   
Model 2 
b1 b2 r ζ α m n λ Cmax Smax Qmax1 QBinding 
100 10 12% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 20 160 4,044 200 
       0.3   2,794  
       0.4   2,170  
      ⅓ 0.2 20 160 3,715 200 
       0.3   2,567  
       0.4   1,993  
  15% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 20 160 5,026 200 
       0.3   3,444  
       0.4   2,652  
      ⅓ 0.2 20 160 4,555 200 
       0.3   3,121  
       0.4   2,404  
50 10 12% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 40 320 8,087 200 
       0.3   5,589  
       0.4   4,339  
      ⅓ 0.2 40 320 7,430 200 
       0.3   5,135  
       0.4   3,987  
  15% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 40 320 10,052 200 
       0.3   6,887  
       0.4   5,305  
      ⅓ 0.2 40 320 9,109 200 
       0.3   6,241  
       0.4   4,807  
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Model 3 
b1 b2 r ζ α m n λ T Cmax Smax Qmax1 Qmax2 QBinding 
100 10 12% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 180 20 3,740 2,417 137 137 
       0.3    1,611   
       0.4    1,208   
      ⅓ 0.2 180 20 3,740 2,394 137 137 
       0.3    1,596   
       0.4    1,197   
      ¼ 0.2 240 20 4,940 2,417 137 137 
       0.3    1,611   
       0.4    1,208   
      ⅓ 0.2 240 20 4,940 2,394 137 137 
       0.3    1,596   
       0.4    1,197   
  15% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 180 20 3,740 2,279 137 137 
       0.3    1,520   
       0.4    1,140   
      ⅓ 0.2 180 20 3,740 2,253 137 137 
       0.3    1,502   
       0.4    1,127   
      ¼ 0.2 240 20 4,940 2,279 137 137 
       0.3    1,520   
       0.4    1,140   
      ⅓ 0.2 240 20 4,940 2,253 137 137 
       0.3    1,502   
       0.4    1,127   
50 10 12% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 180 40 7,480 4,833 274 200 
       0.3    3,222   
       0.4    2,417   
      ⅓ 0.2 180 40 7,480 4,788 274 200 
       0.3    3,192   
       0.4    2,394   
      ¼ 0.2 240 40 9,880 4,833 274 200 
       0.3    3,222   
       0.4    2,417   
      ⅓ 0.2 240 40 9,880 4,788 274 200 
       0.3    3,192   
       0.4    2,394   
  15% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 180 40 7,480 4,559 274 200 
       0.3    3,039   
       0.4    2,279   
      ⅓ 0.2 180 40 7,480 4,506 274 200 
       0.3    3,004   
       0.4    2,253   
      ¼ 0.2 240 40 9,880 4,559 274 200 
       0.3    3,039   
       0.4    2,279   
      ⅓ 0.2 240 40 9,880 4,506 274 200 
       0.3    3,004   
       0.4    2,253   
Notes: The model is solved for endogenous variables Cmax, Smax and Qmax where Cmax is the maximum monthly contribution, Smax 
is the maximum savings accumulated from the contributions, and Qmax is the potential maximum loan per period. Total loan 
advanced is given by QBinding = min {y/b2, Qmax}.  The values of the endogenous variables depicted in the table above signify the 
breakeven threshold that ensures the circuit is Pareto-neutral.  For this simulation, the exogenous parameters are: (i) member 
monthly after tax income: y = $2,000; (ii) income multiplier constraint: b1,1 = 80 times, b1,2 = 40 times; (iii) loan multiplier 
constraint: b2 = 25 times; (iv) cost of funds: r1 = 12%, r2 = 15%; (v) transaction and default costs: ζ = 2% and α =10%; (vi) 
membership gestation period: m = 6 months; (vii) fraction of borrowers in the circuit: λ1 = 0.2, λ2 = 0.3; λ3 = 0.4; (viii) loan 
tenure: n1 = 7 days (¼ month); n2 = 10 days (⅓ month); (ix) loan commencement period: t = 1; and (x) circuit life: T1 = 15 years 
(180 months), T2 = 20 years (240 months).  
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 Glossary of Arabic terms 
 
Arabic term Closest English meaning 
fiqh Islamic jurisprudence. 
hiba Voluntary gift. 
ijtihād Literally ‘exertion’.  It implies independent deduction of laws not 
self-evident from the primary sources, namely the Qur’ān and 
Sunnah. 
qard The act of extending interest-free loan from one’s property without 
expectations of gains. It is also known as qard hasan or qardah-yi 
hasanah.  
Qur’ān The holy book of Islam. 
ribā An injunction protecting property rights.  This is generally 
misinterpreted as usury or interest. 
ribā an-nasi’ah This is termed as evident ribā.  It is generally an injunction to deter 
expropriation of assets on deferred exchanges.  It also mitigates 
financial fragility and the exclusion of underprivileged from 
financial services. 
sadaqah  Voluntary offering or alms from a person’s wealth.  
salaf The granting of loan subjected to repayment at a later time. 
shari’ah Islamic law 
sunnah The practices of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH.  Along with the 
Qur’ān and Hadith (recorded sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), 
it is a major source of Shari’ah, or Islamic law. 
takāful Islamic insurance that functions similar to mutuals. 
waqf (awqāf – 
plural) 
Philanthropic foundations involving the endowment of privately 
owned properties for charitable purposes in perpetuity. 
zakāt Literally ‘cleansing or purity’.  It implies a religious tax to be 
deducted from one’s wealth to help the needy.  
 
 
 
